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Governing in the Vernacular:
Eugen Ehrlich and Late Habsburg
Ethnography
MONICA EPPINGER

INTRODUCTION

E

UGEN EHRLICH'S LEGACY in Anglophone scholarship presents us with

a conundrum. Legal scholars recognise Ehrlich's work as having
decisive effects on the course of twentieth-century American juris

prudence. US legal historians cite his contributions to the Free Schooll that
exerted a dispositive influence on the inception of Legal Realism and the
creation of whole new bodies of US law; critical legal studies scholars2 and
legal anthropologists3 still credit his understanding of 'living law' in their
work on the limits of formal law. While Ehrlich's ideas are acknowledged
for their influences, his claims themselves are rarely probed and the man
himself is largely unknown. We are left with little to evaluate the competing
interpretations of his legacy.

Which version-visionary

foundation

layer for enlightened administration or righteous critic of state fetishism
is more true to Ehrlich's project? Anglophone scholarship offers few
answers. Beyond habitual genuflection by the meticulous legal academic
and brief, rare citation by the specialised historian,4 Ehrlich is a cipher.
Little is available in English-language sources about his life or intellectual

l See, eg J Whitman, book r eview of Franfois Geny e la scienza giurdica del Nouecento
(March 1995) 67 The Journal of Modern History 176.
c See, eg D Kennedy, 'Two GlobalizatIons of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968' 36
Suffolk Unwerslty Law Reuiew 631 at 648-9.
J See, eg L Nader, The L4e of the LIU' (Berkeley, University of California Press, 20(2) 136
Ihereinafter: Nader, Life). See also L Nader, 'The Anthropological Studv of Law' (December
1965) in The Ethnography of Law (special issue of American Anthropologist, L Nader (cd),
67 American Anthropologist 6).
4 See, eg B Hett, 'The "Captain of Koepenick" and the Tr ansformation of German Criminal
Justice, 1819-1914' (2003) 36 Central European Jlmsprudence 1.

22

Monica Eppinger

formation.s He is virtually unmentioned in the history of Bukovina or

\\

Ukraine, although he is undoubtedly the most internationally influential

'f1,r

legal scholar either has produced. This is particularly surprising, given how

I L

seriously legal scholars took Ehrlich's advice to examine the social move

.\ l ...

ment behind a legal thinker in order to understand what is going on and

\\ 1 '"

possible causes.6 A background contention of this chapter is that this gap

,,\

in our understanding of Ehrlich's life leaves us vulnerable to misreading or

1 r:; 1

missing some points in his work.
How much do we know of Ehrlich's setting and personal history? The
bare facts do not reveal much. Ehrlich was born in Chernivtsi, the capital of
Bukovina in Austria (now Ukraine). He trained at the University of Vienna

:.. 7!lf
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,
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in law and served as a docent there until returning to Chernivtsi as profes

;'( ,..:

sor of Roman law in 1898. He was made rector of the university in 1906

,1,...1{1

and died in 1922.
Ehrlich's program gives us a point of entry to examine his principal ideas

'" t
i"e

more closely. In a talk to the Juridical Society of Vienna in 1903, Ehrlich
lays out a new vision for what law is and how legal science should proceed.
Ehrlich contrasts a 'dynamic conception of law'-which legal science until
then was ill-equipped to fathom-with the 'traditional, dogmatic concep
tion' of a bounded set of legal rules governed by formal logic and sophis
ticated doctrine'! To understand law in its dy namic conception, Ehrlich
suggests that we turn to three sources: decisions of the courts (mindful that
every decision is the result of a number of factors, only one of which is the
text of a legal rule); actual legal transactions that have not had to resort
to courts or government agencies for adjudication; and, most importantly,
the 'facts of daily life, apart from their legal aspect'. 'In reality life creates
primarily its own rules', apart from the rules of law.8 Legal scholars should
undertake investigations of real life and furnish them back to the courts to
inform judicial decisions.9 In this program, Ehrlich sets up a new challenge
for legal science that demands new equipment.10

. .'

5 Notable exceptions are A Likhovski, 'Czernowitz, Lincoln, Jerusalem, and the Comparative
History of American Jurisprudence' (2003) 4 Theoretical Inquiries In Law 621; and B Weiler,
'E Pluribus Unum? The Kakanian Intellectual and the Question of Cultural Pluralism', MS
of paper presented at the conference, "The Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New
Approaches in Graduate Studies", at St Anthony's College Oxford, available at <http://users.
ox.ac.ukl-oaceslconference/paperslBernd_Weiler. pdf> accessed 22 July 2008.
6 E Ehrlich, 'Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects' (a translation of
Ehrlich's 'Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft' (Leipzig, 1903)} in E Bnmcken
and L Register (trs), The SCience of Legal Method: Selected Essays by Vartous Authors (New
York, Macmillan, 1921) 78 (hereinafter: Ehrlich, 'Judicial Freedom').
- Ibid 78.
8 Ibid 78-80.
9 Ibid 83.
10
ThiS term comes from Paul Rabmow. See P Rabinow, Anthropos Today: ReflectIOns on
Modern EqUipment (Princeton, NJ, Pnnceton Umversity Press, 2003).

Gouerning in the Vernacular

23

When he searched for adequate equipment, Ehrlich found a technology
increasingly

common in his milieu,

the Slavic hinterlands of the

Habsburg empire around the turn of the twentieth century.ll The tool
was ethnography.12 Ehrlich did not invent this method of inquiry-it
was already practised throughout central Europe-but he did use it in
new ways. In this chapter, I examine the practice of ethnography as an
artifact. In trying to learn more about Ehrlich's intellectual formation,
ethnography focuses our attention on where he came from, as a tool spe
cific to Ehrlich's time and location, and on where he ends up, as a tool
that transformed him and his discipline. I propose that ethnography was
one answer to a certain set of problems formulated in the late Habsburg
period. This chapter, then, explores Ehrlich's work, specifically his meth
odological program using ethnography for making legal decisions. I will
take up, in turn, what ethnography meant in his time; a survey of the
late Habsburg landscape in which ethnography was conceived as a means
for solving practical problems; and finally some modest proposals for
further work.
THE DESCRIPTIVE VERSUS NORMATIVE REGISTER
IN FIN-DE-SIECLE ETHNOGRAPHY

Ethnography is a familiar term to us, but we should not assume too much;
its meaning has undergone considerable slippage since Ehrlich's time. It is
worth examining, briefly, how ethnography was understood in Austria
Hungary at the turn of the century.
Ethnography was meant first as a descriptive genre. Critical think
ers dating back to Kant have marked a categorical difference between a
descriptive work and a normative work. Ehrlich articulated his view of
this demarcation in the critique of Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois that
he wrote for Justice HolInes. The French term del/oir permits an elision
between the meaning of 'ought' and 'is', he says, signifying 'both what
ought to be and what must be'. Montesquieu mostly uses deuoir in the for
mer meaning, but he was influenced enough by natural law beliefs 'as not
to draw a sharp line between the law that ought to be and the law that is',

11 This should not be read as the start of an argument for environmental or social determin
ism nor, necessarily, a claim for uniqueness. It is rather an effort to explore the particulars of
Ehrlich's context.
12 Ethnographers from Bukovina and Galicia working at the same time as Ehrlich did as a
publishing jurist include the team working out of Cviv (or, in Austrian or Yiddish, Lemberg),
of Xv Volkov, M Zubritskiy, M Russov, M Litvinova-Bartush, A Veretelnyk, M Shishkevych,
V Domanitzkiy, 01 Radakov, M Dikarev; famed folklorist V Hnatiuk; folklorist and writer Sh
Aleykum; ethnographer of legal affairs S Dniestrzanski; and, overlapping with the last decade
of Ehrlich's career, B Malinowski.

I
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which Ehrlich denounces as vagueness.13 Ehrlich intended his ethnography
to be a record of what people are actually doing, rather than a prescription
for what they should be doing.
He points us to several peers, most of them Austro-Hungarian, who in his
view have taken up the same agenda as he has. Bogosic, a Croat, drew up
a questionnaire (of more than 800 questions!), the answers to which form
the basis of a work on southern Slavs (Zbornik Sadasnih Pravnih Obicaja

Juznih Slovena). Bobcev adopted Bogosic's method and produced a collec
tion of Bulgarian customary law, Sbornik na Blgarski Juriditski Obitschai.14
They ventured into the countryside like nineteenth-century Romantic folk
lorists, collecting legal custom instead of fairytales. The survey method was
also taken up by fin-de-siecle British anthropology: witness members of
the 1896 Torres Straights expedition clambering ashore to query a small
number of informants from a given list of questions. IS This hit-and-run
methodology could yield staggering amounts of data in a short period of
time. We will examine later how Ehrlich distinguishes his work from theirs
and how his work transforms the method. This initial look at least gives
us a glimpse of the starting point of ethnography when Ehrlich took it up.
The ethnographer was collector and describer; his work involved collecting
data through surveys, usually in rural areas, and writing it up into detailed
descriptions.
BEYOND IS VERSUS OUGHT

That said, we should be aware that Ehrlich and his central European peers
regarded ethnography as potentially more active than we would be prone to.
Even if a description was not delivered in a normative register, Ehrlich and
his contemporaries understood that description under some circumstances
could be creative-a form of performative speech.16 Here is how. In late
Habsburg Austria, ethnography was used as a synonym, in some instances,
for ethnicity or ethnic group.I:- Within an empire where certain rights
were, by definition, group rights (meaning that recognition of some rights
depended on a certain kind of legal recognition of the group), discerning,

13 E Ehrlich, 'Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence' (April 1916) 29 Harvard Law
ReVIew 582 at 583 (hereinafter: Ehrlich, 'Montesquieu').
14 E Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, W Moll (tr) (New York,
Russell and Russell, 1962 (1913)) 464-5 (hereinafter: Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles). The

other peer Ehrlich cites is a Spaniard, Costa, who used direct observation to produce a com
pendium of legal relations in real life.
15 For one ethnography resulting from such an expedition, see W Rivers, The Todas (New
York, Macmillan, 1906).
16
For an explanation of performative speech, see JL Austin, How to Do Thmgs With Words
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1962).
1- T Snyder, personal communication, 17 April 2006.
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naming, describing a social group in a certain way could be part of building
an argument for group recognition. 18 Description could be a political
act or have political consequences. 'Ethnicity' and 'nation' were both terms
for politically aspirant groups. Turn-of-the-century Ukrainian nationalist

his

Ivan Franko called for an independent country within what he and his

up

generation called 'ethnographic' borders.19 The Ivan Frankos, the Theodor

rm

Herzls, of Austria-Hungary understood that ethnography, creating a writ

..1/a

ten record of an ethnos, could serve to etch ethnos in consciousness, map

cc

it onto territory, inscribe it in history. This logic was later borne out in the

14
/.

entry into international law of the right of a people to self-determination

,lk

and the emergence of Habsburg successor states based on claims of ethnic
ity and nationality-a Bulgaria, a Poland, eventually an Israel, a Ukraine.
Habsburg political organisation set the stage for nation-state successors by
according legal recognition of certain rights based on inclusion in or exclu

run

sion from a group that had established some precursor claims. Over time,

of

ethnography was a way to stake a claim as a 'people' , to build an argument

Elrs

for self-determination. That came after the war (World War I), of course: a

yes

central Europe of nation-states was beyond Ehrlich's historical horizon and,

up.

as far as we can discern, was nowhere in the realm of his expectations. To

:mg

understand some of the impetus for ethnography before the war, we need

iled

to look at the Austria-Hungary that preceded. We start with a most local
institution, the university in Ehrlich's hometown where he taught and did
most of his research into living law, and then we move on to his native
province and the empire into which it fit.

eers

THE ETHNOGRAPHER
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Ehrlich's Bukovina and Vienna's Ehrlich
Bukovina
The University of Czernowitz, where Ehrlich would become professor in
the law school and then rector, came into being as part of a wave of Liberal
state institution-building in the 1870s.20 A member of Bukovina crown

18 T his kind of power of description is not unknown in the US legal system . Jeremy King,
for example, compares Habsburg group classifications and their effects with a similar process
In contemporary US affirmative action law. See, eg J King, 'Group Rights in Liberal Austria:
the Dilemma of Classificatory Procedure' (November 2005) (MS).
19 T Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 15691999 (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2003).
20
After they won a parliamentary majority, Liberals displaced the army from its parade
grounds in the centre of Vienna and on the site erected buildings of the University of Vienna
(built 1873-84) that Ehrlich attended, as well as the house of the Austrian Parliament (built

1874-83).
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land parliament, Constantin Tomaszczuk, led the campaign to convince
Vienna to fund a university in Czernowitz. He argued that the monarchy
would be well served by a university in its eastern borderlands as an instru
ment of unity through enlightenment, prestige associated with German
language science and learning, and common enculturation. A university
in Czernowitz, Tomaszczuk argued, 'could be an intellectual fortress,
which will secure the unity and integrity of the monarchy much better
than bastions lined with cannons'.21 Two Austro-Hungarian universi
ties, Tomaszczuk's alma mater the University of Lemberg (L'viv) and
the University of Cracow, had recently (in 1870-71) been 'polonised' .
Slavicism seemed provincial and separatist; the empire needed non-Slavic
alternatives in the East. With the help of Baron Gheorghe Hurmuzaki,
who led his fellow Romanian aristocrats in Bukovina's Landtag to support
the plan,22 Tomaszczuk's initiative succeeded. T he Austrian Government
converted an existing theological institute into the Franz Josef University of
Czernowitz, consisting of three sections (fakultaten): theology; philosophy,
philology and natural sciences; and law and political economy. It opened on
4 October

1875.

T he Imperial Charter for the University explicitly recognised the pluralistic
population the university would serve, as well as the transcendent ideals of
learning and Austrian citizenship it hoped to inculcate. It read:
As the German, so the Romanian and the Slav gladly quenches his thirst and
draws strength from the fountain of German science; this in greater measure will
offer him the means to retain and nurture his individuality; but it will also be an
inducement to work and strive together toward the happiness and glory of our
beloved fatherland, Austria.23

Reading these words today, we must remind ourselves that 'Germany '
was a nascent project, having just formed as a unified country in 1871.
'German science' might here refer to affiliation with a certain Western
Enlightenment discourse, expressed in German tongue, or common cause
with a learned elite of Vienna and other Habsburg cities. It did not refer
to a science produced on the territory of a long-standing German political
entity. Hegemony was conveyed in the 'science' at least as much as in the
'German' .

21 Constantin Tomaszczuk, quoted in R Wagner, Yom Moldauwappen zum Doppeludler:
Ausgewdhlte Beitrdge zur Geschichgte der Bukowina (Augsburg, Hormann-Verlag, 1991) 282,
cIted by I Livezeanu, Cultural Politics m Greater Romunia (Ithaca, Cornell Umversity Press,
1995) 228. T he author cited, Rudolf Wagner, was a student at the University of Czernowitz
from 1930 to 1932. Livezeanu, Ibid 228.
22
I Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romama (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
19951, citing Wagner.
2:1 ,\1 Popescu-Spineni, Instltutll de malta cultura (V alenii-de-Munte, Danna romaneasca,
1932) 175-76, 178, CIted In Livezeanu, above n 22, 228.

.
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Tomaszczuk, named first rector of the new university, indicated this dual

fly

supranational orientation towards political and moral affiliation in his

u

inaugural speech. A Liberal presumption of equality of men underwrites

Il

his assertion of the capacity of education for 'levelling up'. 'German science

ItY

has a claim to universality ', he said. 'And because German education has

5S,

a universal importance, non-German sons of Bukovina also strive for this

:er

German university.' As if to confirm that 'German science' referred to a form

SI

of learned discourse or to the elite that produced it instead of a product of

nd

'Germany', Tomaszczuk went on to embrace plurality and advocate open

d'.

ness. 'Beware to the nation which has to be afraid of the influence of foreign
cultures. T his nation is signing its own death certificate.' His reaffirmation,
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We are not only Poles, Germans, Romanians, we are in the first place human
beings, with roots in the same soil out of which we draw our common strength,
and by this I mean our Austria ...
contains elements of a transcendent call to humanism, an appeal to empire
loyalty and a naming of even narrower ethnic identities. Clearly, collective
identity and personal loyalties were objects of interest or anxiety; his atten
tion marks them as emergent and contested. After we look at the social world
of Bukovina and the political currents that defined the Austria that encom
passed it, we may return to consider whether we agree with his conclusion
that '[t]he university in Czernowitz is an authentic Austrian concept'.24
Even before the university was founded, the Chernivtsi25 of Ehrlich's
childhood was ruled by a Catholic dynasty, host to an eastern Orthodox
seminary and home to a significant Jewish community. As provincial capi
tal, it was the centre of its own regional hinterland (where Ehrlich chose to
conduct his first ethnographic research). Vis-a-vis tbe wider world, the city
lay on the frontier of three highly developed oecumenes (Russian, Austrian
and Romanian), ruled by three different dy nastic traditions and divided

ern

between mutually unintelligible language families (Slavic, Germanic and

use

Romance).26 Traders, translators and other specialists in border hustling

:fer

were native species.27 Moreover, Chernivtsi was a post on centuries-old

ical
the
Tomaszczuk, quoted in Wagner, above n 21, 282, cited by l.ivezeanu, above n 22, 229.
A note of explanation on place names is due here. Part of the Austrian heritage is a
toleration of a plethora of toponyms for a single place in the many dialects of a regIOn. 'To
name Ehrlich's hometown, Czernowltz IS the Germani,ation of the Ukramian Chernivtsi and
the Romanian Cernauri. Because Ukrainian speakers were a plurality of the province's popula
tion at the time, I will refer to it by the Ukramian name, Chernvltsi, unless naming a specific
;\ustrian institution like the university, in which case I will use Czernowitz.
26 O
f course, before Austrian rule, this area had at times been part of the borderlands con
tested with Tnrkev. Assaf Likhovski has concentrated on the formative intluence of location
dnd frontier on Ehrlich's work (LikhosvskI, above n 5).
2- For an insightful description of a present-day Bukovma border city dvnamIC, see D Blank,
'falrvtale Cynicism in the Kingdom of PlastIC Bags: Powerlessness of Place in a Ukrail1lan
Border Town' (autumn 20041 5(3) Ethnography.
24
25

lier:
282,
ress,
\Vltz
ress,
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riparian trade routes connecting north-eastern Europe to the Black Sea,
and from there to the Caucasus, Ottoman lands and beyond, bringing even
more remote and exotic peoples and professions into contact and residence.
As a result, Bukovina was a miniature of the cohabitating 'compact popula
tions' of the pluralistic empire. In this, Ehrlich enjoyed a typically Austrian
childhood milieu. It is difficult to assess how quiet or remote its residents
perceived Bukovina to be, but at least it was cosmopolitan. Ehrlich himself
noted the diversity of community traditions thriving in this small prov
ince, counting Armenians, Germans, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks,
Hungarians and Gy psies among those bringing different way s of life to
Bukovina society.28
This was no different for Austria as a whole. By the 1910 census,
Germans constituted less than 25 per cent of the monarchy's population; the
rest belonged to 'minority populations'.29 Notably, Austria and Bukovina
did not cultivate an ideology of a 'melting pot'. As the Polish-Austrian
subject and anthropology graduate student Bronislaw Malinowski wrote
to his British dissertation adviser: 'There is no such blooming thing as an
"Austrian" -it is a pure fiction'. Happily, thought Malinowski, Austria
was 'a confederation of fairly autonomous peoples'.30 This is not to overly
romanticise the situation. Assimilation became an aspiration for some,
and by the turn of the twentieth century, Vienna had the highest conver
sion rate of Jews to Christianity in Europe.31 One can, however, note
the effects of an imperial policy of toleration. Communities within one
locale maintained distinct practices, even languages, from each other, and
the period during which Ehrlich published all of his significant writings
was one of rising ethnic identification and political nationalism within
the empire. Self-consciousness about group identity and curiosity about
other groups were remarkable. Take, for example, the content of a series of

28
E Ehrlich, 'Das lebende Recht der Volker der Bukovina' in E Ehrlich and M Rehbinder
(eds), Recht und Leben: Gesammelt Schriften zur Rechtstatsachenforschung und zur
Frierechtslehre (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1967 (1913)) 43.
29
R Kann, The MulttnatlOnal Empire: Nationalism and NatIOnal Reform in the
Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1914, Vol. II EmpIre Reform (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1950) 299-307. Note that in the 1910 census, individuals were not asked their
nationality but which language they spoke and which confession they belonged to. Also
problematic, not all languages that were spoken in the realm could be selected as a mother
tongue, only those that were recognised as 'national languages' in the terms of art XIX of
the 1867 Constitution. This ruled out Yiddish; most Yiddish-speaking Jews from Galicia
chose Polish and most from Bukovina chose German. This clarification adapted from
Weiler, above n 5.
30 Malinowski's letter to Seligman (1914) quoted III R Firth, 'Malinowski as Scientist and as
Man' in R Firth (ed), Man and Culture: An EualuatlOn of the Work of Bromslaw MalinowskI
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957) 13.
31 D Edmonds and J Eidinow, Wittgenstetn's Poker (New York, HarperCollins Publishers,

2001) 94.
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for-pay adult-educatIOn courses offered by the Chernivtsi Historical Society
in 1912. The syllabus included:
... world history; Ukrainian history; history of the formation of state, region,
and community; ... geography of the world and Ukraine; anthropology and
ethnography (about types and life ways of people); history of culture (and
discovery); ... history of religion; Ukrainian language and literature;
cooperation.32

Themes of national consciousness, curiosity about others and concerns
about how to live together in a cosmopolitan mix were clearly not exclusive
to Ehrlich and the law school.
Over the last decades of the nineteenth century, as the growth of capital
ism and pursuit of Liberal political reforms reshaped the Austrian landscape,
ethnicities and confessions responded differently to changing opportunity
structures. The experience of Jews, often the limit case for European Liberal
reforms seeking to replace status-based economics and politics with a free
competition of equal individuals, may be looked at to measure Chernivtsi's
climate for national minorities. Despite marked anti-Semitism in Vienna by
the 1890s,33 Chernivtsi remained relatively hospitable to Jews. In the last
decades before the First World War, Chernivtsi had several Jewish mayors34
and-in part because of the law school led by Ehrlich-by 1914, 86 per
cent of the town's lawyers were Jewish.35
Now that we have delineated and taken measure of Bukovina's plural
ism, we must take a further step to slip into a Bukovinian mindset: we must
play with the categories, for the categories themselves produced fluidity,
arbitrage and slippage. Identities were assumed, lost, cultivated; groups
were imagined, resented, taken pride in, historicised, credited and discred
ited. Witness Ehrlich's own story: born a Chernivtsi Jew, a native speaker
of Polish, he became a convert to Catholicism, educated and educating in
German. What do we call such a person? Certainly without error we can
call him a Bukovinian and an Austrian. (Of course, the meanings of those
terms too were emergent, changing over the course of Ehrlich's life.) What
does this mean for his work?
I propose that this milieu fundamentally informed Ehrlich's conception of
society (and, we shall see later, of law). 'Pluralist' was not an adjective that

32 '113 HauIllx TOsaPCTB [From our Societies], in 3 Hoea EYKoeulia [Nova Bukovma]
(Chernivtsi, 18 January 1912) 3.
33 JW Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social
Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1981); and C Schorske, Fm-de
Siecle Vienna: PolitICS and Culture (New York, Knopf, 1979).
34 W McCagg, A HIstory of Habsburg Jews, 1670--1918 (Bloomington, IN, Indiana
University Press, 1989) 172-3, cited in Livezeanu, above n 22,55.
35 H Sternberg, 'Zur Geschichte der Juden in Czernowitz' in H Gould (ed), Geschichte der
Juden in der Bukovina, vol 2 (Tel Aviv, Olamenu, 1962) 46, cited in Livezeanu, above n 22,55.
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might or might not modify 'society ' . Instead, pluralism for Ehrlich was an
inherent quality of society:
Society is the sum total of the human associations that have mutual relations
with one another. And these associations that constitute human society are very
heterogeneous.36

A person belongs to many associations simultaneously; membership over
laps and changes. Moreover, the 'interdependence of all elements of social
life is assumed'.37 Unlike, say, holism of British social anthropology of the
time, Ehrlich's holism does not necessarily rely on a metaphor of a 'social
structure' , an internally consistent mechanism that could be described
sy nchronically. For Ehrlich:
... the social order is not fixed and unchangeable ... It is in constant flux. Old
institutions disappear, new ones come into existence, and those which remain
change their content constantly.38

A living organism, not a fixed structure, is the image that comes to mind.
To understand society, the sociologist must pay attention to the particu
larities of these many human associations. Bukovina's pluralism suggested,
then, not only a particular conception of society, but a particular method
of apprehending and studying it. Ethnography, for the Bukovinian Ehrlich,
becomes not just a means of recording a series of folkways, but a method
for understanding a sum total constantly in flux.

Vienna: Liberal Order in the Era of Ausgleich
T he last decades of the Habsburg empire in which Ehrlich lived and
worked were a period of compressed political change. A rise and decline
of Liberalism, which in other parts of Europe took decades to articu
late into political philosophy and political organisation, were squeezed
into a span of roughly a quarter of a century in late Habsburg Austria.
At the same time, a grand compromise (Ausgleich) with Hungary and
'little compromises,39 with other constituent parts of Austria organised
Austria-Hungary into an agglomeration of polities, each with their own

36

Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles, above n 14, 26.
Ehrlich, 'Montesquieu', above n 13,586.
38 E Ehrlich, 'The Sociology of Law' (December 1922) 36 Haward Law Rel'ieU! 130 at
139. We find a bridge between the two in SF Nadel. Nadel, like Malinowski, was an Austrian
bv birth and upbringing who became a central figure in British SOCIal anthropology, but he
stayed in Vienna longer into his adulthood and his thinking was more In Ehrlich's line: more
attuned to complex relations, the artificiality of boundaries and clunge over time. See, eg
SF Nadel, Black ByzantIum: the Kingdom of Nupe in Nlgena (London, Oxford University
Press Publisher for the International Institute of African Language<, and Cultures, 1942).
19 Jeremy King alerted me to this late Habsburg phenomenon. Sec, cg Kll1g, above n 18. See
also J King, 'Group RIghts in Liberal Austria: Dilemmas of EqualIty' IApnl 20(6) (MS).
17

Gouerning in the Vernacular

an

31

system of traditional rights.40 Where Ausgleich politics sought to preserve
local traditions of noble privilege within the order of the empire, Liberalism
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worked from an assumption of a shared human nature justifying claims
for equal political rights and an equal capacity for economic success given
equal opportunity. The core tenets of Austrian Liberalism were that 'the
freedom and worth of the human being are the highest values'.41 A corner
stone of the Liberal ideology was an Enlightenment belief that each person
was a blank slate, theoretically equally capable, who could be raised to a
common level through education. This version of laissez-faire had a pro
gressive cast, seeking to replace privilege or charity as the basis of access
to economic opportunity. In the last half-century before the First World
War, Austria-Hungary's political reorganisations addressed the recurrent

Old

question: local noble privilege or universal equal rights? Throughout
Ehrlich's life, accommodations to these two movements and tensions
between them produced a different kind of state and innovative technologies
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of governance unlike anything in Europe. A few examples from its political
history and technologies of governance may suffice to convey a sense of
this peculiar empire.
Between 1860 and 1867, a series of pressures led to a remaking of the
Austrian political order, with several fundamental changes incorporating
local representation under a constitutional monarchy. The Constitutional
Law (Diploma) of 1860 reinstated the old constitutions belonging to the
different lands of the monarchy and gave legislative power to the provincial
Diets. The Diploma was a concession of 'state-right' (a body of privileges
which maintained a nation's independence while acceding to Habsburg
rule) to the conservative aristocracy of different crown lands attached to

and

their 'local liberties' and hostile to 'German centralism'.42 The Patent of
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1861 established a parliament, the Reichsrat, at Vienna, with members
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nominated by the provincial Diets until an 1873 law provided for direct
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elections. The Ausgleich with Hungary in 1867 recognised the Hungarian
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parliament and nobility as co-equal with the Austrian, with Franz Josef head
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of both. Within the emerging system, each province maintained its own
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political structure and indigenous nobility with attendant privileges. Franz

Jwn

Josef was simultaneously emperor of one crown land, king of another and
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40 Considering a longer time horizon, one of Kann's theses is that Austria-Hungary became
an 'empire' somewhat by a series of accidents, not military or commercial conquest; within,
what spread was not homogenous law, but an overarching respect for local custom. R Kann,
A History of the Habsburg EmpIre. 1526-1918 (Berkeley, University of California Press,
1974).
41 This description of the core tenets of Austrian Liberalism was formulated to describe
Ukrainian Austrian Liberal Myhhailo Drahomanov. I Rudnytsky, 'Drahomanov as Political
Theorist' in P Rudnytsky (ed), Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton, Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987) 205.
+2 J Berenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700-1918 (Harlow. Addison Wesley,
1990\ 210.
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archduke of y et another, his different titles reflecting the variety of polities
he simultaneously headed.
In its peculiar history, as an accidental empire, and in its peculiar means
of self-preservation, by striking constitutional compromises (first in the
Diploma and then in a series of Ausgleichs) with the polities of its heart
land, Austria-Hungary by the early 1900s was a genre of state distinct
from its European contemporaries. The common term 'empire' disguises
deep differences: the relationship between ruler, ruled and territory did not
follow patterns seen elsewhere in Europe. Austria-Hungary did not seek
overseas colonies, was constituted only of geographically contiguous lands
and ruled its territories neither by overt military force nor by 'indirect rule'.
One reference explains it thus. There was Hungary, and then:
The rest of the empire was a casual agglomeration without even a clear descrip
tion. Technically it was known as 'the kingdoms and lands represented in the
Reichsrat [parliament]' ... These confusions had a simple cause: the empire of
Austria with its various fragments was the dynastic possession of the House of
Habsburg, not a state with any common consciousness or purpose.43

In ex change for confirming the Ausgleich with Hungary, the Liberals
won a series of concessions from the Emperor towards securing the rights
of individuals,44 creating an impartial judiciary and guaranteeing free
dom of belief and education. In the non-Hungarian provinces, then, the
Austrian Constitution of 1867 gave Austria a Liberal regime. The right
to vote was granted to non-noble Austrian men, but under a weighted
voting sy stem in which voting males directly elected 72 of 425 members
of the Reichsrat. The remaining members were designated to other curia
(electoral bodies or voting blocks): great estate owners were allotted a
certain number of members of parliament, chambers of commerce oth
ers, and rural districts, others. Each provincial elected assembly consisted
of similar blocks of seats, to which members were elected by their curia.
While the division into curia by forms of property ownership or types of
residential locale might have compounded the pluralism of a poly ethnic
empire, in fact not uncommonly they were associated with ethnicity. For
example, in Galicia, large estate owners were almost exclusively 'Polish'
(and in Bukovina, Polish or Romanian), meaning that if a family of
another ethnicity, say Ukrainian, managed to gain land-owning status,
it would adopt Polish language and religion and become Polish. In some
cases, crown land Landtag elections may have even served to strengthen

43 'Austria-Hungary' in Encyclopedta Britantca Micropedta (15th cdn. London, Encyclopedia
Britanica, 2002) 720.
44 Art 2, Fundamental Law [of Austria] 142, regarding the (".!leTa! Rights of Citizens.
(Article 2 read: 'All citizens are equal before the law.')
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ethnic identities and loyalties, to mobilise voting blocks. The 'compact
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dispersed populations that compacted themselves: in 1910, one-quarter

populations' of the empire may to some extent have been the result of
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of the inhabitants of Austria (6,350,000 people) had changed their politi
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cal district.45 Records do not show clearly how many stayed in place but
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Curia is one of many terms for expressing group identities in Austria
Hungary, leaving us to grope towards understanding and translation. Take,
for example, turn-of-the-century political theorist Mykhailo Drahomanov's
explanation that 'the Jews in Ukraine represent [simultaneously] a nation,
a religion, and a social class', where 'social class' (the Ukrainian cocJ1obie
(soslovie)), the later historian Rudnytsky tells us, translates literally as
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'estate', which is one of the translations offered for curia.46 The measures
for trying to manage pre-existing systems of privileges and the curia they
mark within the legal order of the empire may have informed Ehrlich's
understanding of the human associations that, in his theory, form a social
order. One can imagine the analogy at work. Nobles enjoyed privileges,
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special bodies of customary rights recognised by the Ausgleich constitutions
and laws. Non-nobles did not enjoy the nobles' advantages and special rec
ognition by the state, but the alternative was not the null set; it was clear
that non-nobles too had their discernable bodies of custom and particular
sets of rights arising from their legal relations.47 Ehrlich sets out to inves
tigate them and proposes their incorporation into the legal order through
judicial and administrative decision-making.
The occasional (but not automatic) association of ethnicity with eco
nomic identity, such as that which we see in some of the curia, was clear
to Ehrlich. In a 1909 work based on research in Roman law, Ehrlich
argues that the legal capacity of an individual and his or her position in the
economic order are always related.48 Likewise, in his early ethnography,
a literal investigation into the practices of ethnic groups, he found some
of these ethnic-professional affiliations at work in generating bodies of

5 R 'Wlschenbart, 'Vienna m 1910: A Cll:y WIthout Viennese' in SE Bonner and FP Wagner
eds), Vienna: The World olYesterday, 1889--1914 (Atlantic Highlands , NJ , Humanities Press
International, 1997) 37.
46 M Drahomanov, 'Evrelsk! vopros na Ukraine' ('The JeWIsh Question in Ukraine')
m Sobrame politlchesktkh sochmemi 2 (CollectIOn o( Polttlcal Essays 2) 534, quoted in
I Rudnytsky, 'Mykhailo Drahomanov and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations' in P Rudnytsky (ed),
Essays in Modern Ukralman History (Edmonton , Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies,
1987) 286. Description of votlllg righh and the parliamentary system under the 1867
Constitution may be found 1Il J Berenger, above n 42, 209-89.
r Ehrlich POlllts to an example of a non -noble body of rights in the customary-law research
of Dzniestrzanksi among the bo/ken clan of Ukrainians in Galicia . Ehrlich, Fundamental
PrmClples, above n 14, 499.
48 E Ehrlich, Die Rechtsftihtgkett (l.egal CapaCIty) ( 1909), in the collection of F Kobler, {)as
Rechts (The Law).
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legal relations. For example, in his first work among the rural Ruthenians
(Ukrainians) and Romanians of Bukovina, he discovered that there was:
... [a1 numerous priesthood, which is made up for the most part of the same
families in which this office is usually hereditary, and this priesthood, spread over
a wide territory, forms a nation within a nation, which has its own traditions and
its own customs.49
As he encounters them, Ehrlich treats such professional groups as one of the
human associations to be studied for their legal practices; this insight and
methodological inclusion marks a significant point of departure from other
ethnographers of his day, the Bogosics and the Bobcsevs. Ehrlich considered
both ethnic and professional groups the objects of legal ethnography, treat
ing the two categories as practically analytical equals.
Ethnic groups then were a complicated category, in ethnography and
within the law of the empire. For all of its carve-outs for local bodies of
tradition, there was a limit to the structural parity given to ethnic groups
under the 1867 Constitution. Peoples that had not previously in history had
a named, recognised state did not possess any 'state-right' and constituted
'non-native groups' in Austria and Hungary.50 Both Ukrainians and Jews,
two of the three most numerous populations in Bukovina, were so classified.
Just as the curia coalesced into disciplined voting blocks in the Reichsrat
like the famous Polenklub of Polish Galician estate owners-political alli
ances grew up between the 'non-native' groups. After universal suffrage
in 1906, incidentally the y ear that Ehrlich became rector in Chernivtsi,
cooperative Jewish-Ukrainian voting pacts y ielded electoral successes in the
Bukovina Reichsrat elections for both Jews and Ukranians.
A lack of 'state-right' by no means amounted to complete neglect or
exclusion by the Austrian state. Language offers many examples. The 1867
Constitution made clear guarantees about the right to receive state services
in one's native language, even for those who were linguistic minorities in a
subregion.51 For example, children were to be educated in publicly funded
schools in their mother tongue, if feasible, according to an 1869 federal law.52

49

E Ehrlich, 'Professor Ehrlich's Czernowitz Seminar of Living Law', presented by W Page,

Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the AssoCIatIOn of Amertcan Law Schools
(Chicago, Association of American Law Schools, 1914) 58-9 (heremafter: Ehrltch, 'Seminar').
50 Berenger, above n 42, 216. A group could thus legally be 'non-nattve' without losing a
consensus acknowledgement that its linguistic or historical forebear, pred ated other known
groups in a given region. 'Earliest known' could still mean 'non-nattve·.
51 Art 19, Fundamental Law [of Austria] 142. (Article 19 re,ld: '.-\11 n a ttons [Volksstamme]
of the state are equal in their rights, and each nation ha s the 111\ lola ble rIght to preserve and to
promote its nationality [NatlOnalitat] and language. For all lan"uJ"e, whose use IS customary
in a land, the state recognizes equality of rights in school s . So\ crnrn,'!1( IllStitutlOns, and public
life. In those crownlands inhabited by more than one n,ltlnrl. r'ul'lk In,tltutJons of education
shall enable each of the nations to be educated III Its 1.111, u lC;,. ,,::h. ,ut belllg compelled to
learn a second language of the land.')
52 King, above n 18, 3.
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Perhaps even more indicative of a bottom-up economy of knowledge in the
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empire, army officers were to speak the language spoken by a majority of
their troops.53
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New ideas of balance, conscious of ethnicity but not based on traditional
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privileges, also came into play. For example, different nationalities on local
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governing boards were balanced to create proportionate representation.54
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State-based efforts are not the full story, either. People of the empire cul
tivated other means for regularising friendly contact between ethnicities.
Austrian Social Democrat Karl Renner, a native of Bohemia, recalled in his
autobiography that his family, like many German peasant families, took
part in a tradition of Kinderwechsel, or children's exchange. German chil
dren would spend a year living with a Czech family and attending a Czech
school, and vice versa. The Czech boys who stayed with his family 'called
my parents "Vater" and "Mutter", just as our lads did the Czech parents
C'Otec" and "Matka'' '.55 The children and families who took part, he remi
nisces, remained life-long friends.
These examples show how Austria-Hungary differed from other models
of empire that tried to unite and rule through homogeneity. The important
point for our purposes is the space that the empire's official policies allowed
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for identity to remain unsettled. In its accommodations to a variety of
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languages and practices in its own heartland, the Habsburg House did not
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foreclose certain conditions of possibility56 for variance among political
elites. This is very different from other European states of the time seek
ing to unite through extension of symbolic systems of the metropolis. In
contrast to them and to the totalitarian regimes that later took its place,
one would be tempted to call Austria-Hungary a 'fragmentarian' state. The
Habsburg dynasty did not insist on a common tongue, try to spread one
national origin myth or forge a single national identity. Nor did it use law
as a starting point for identity as, say, US governments did. Its concern
was with loyalty to the Habsburg House, not to the Austrian Constitution.
Emperor Franz Josef permitted the maintenance of separate traditions, dif
ferent levels of political engagement by curia and a variety of forms of eco
nomic engagement, using difference to leverage voting in the parliament.57
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53 I Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer
Corps, 1848-1918 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990).
54 For example, national representation on school boards was closely watched (and fre
quently challenged). See J King, above n 18.
,5 K Renner, An der Wende Zweier Zeiten (Vienna, Danubia-Verlag, 1946) 46.
56 I am indebted to Alexei Yurchak for directing me to conditions of possibility as a focus
01 inquiry.
5- T his point raises serious problems for Likhovski's application of a Turner frontier
hypothesis to understanding Chernivtsi and Ehrlich (Likhovsb, above n 5). Law and its rela
tion to empire are quite different in his Austrian and US cases. As one example of the differing
.lpproaches to governing disparate cultures on the frontier, Austria tried neither to confine the
'other' in reservations nor to contain or exterminate them via cavalry campaigns.
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Nationalism and ethnic identities were increasingly powerful concerns and
practices were cultivated to manage inter-ethnic relations. I suggest that
ethnography was one way of making sense of this milieu and, in Ehrlich's
program, one of many experimental proposals for operationalising tolera
tion that marked this period.

The Supranational Notable and Operationalising Toleration
At the same time that nationalism was rising, a new figure emerged in late
Habsburg Austria defined by expertise rather than origin. A civil service and
army were recruited and educated to administer the empire. Cross-cutting
associations-the army, the state bureaucracy, commerce-provided home,
trajectories, circuits of exchange categorically different from the previous
milieus more closely tied to native place or group. Liberal reforms, chang
ing subjects into citizens, reinforced some of the cross-cutting categories,
demanding duties to the state and recognising rights, indifferent to origin.
As state institutions extended their reach, experience beyond the local began
to extend to lower classes. Take, for example, participation in the army.
Universal conscription was introduced in 1868. One Ukrainian nationalist
newspaper listed the conscription statistics for the province in 1910 as hav
ing in significant numbers Ukrainians, Romanians, Jews, Germans, Poles,
Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks.58 Conscription imposed duties on all, but
also gave openings. As status privileges spread to office-holders, the mean
ing of ethnicity to others changed as well. 59
Berenger tells us that the last decades of the nineteenth century gave rise
to a 'human type', the 'Austrian notable' who had received an education
in law or a military academy and made his career in the administration

58 The relative numbers are listed for 1900 and 1910, respectively, as Ukrainians
('Ruthenians'), 297,798 and 305,101; Romanians ('Wallachians'), 229,018 and 273,254; Jews,
96,150 and 102,919; Germans, 63,336 and 65,935; Poles, 26,857 and 36,205; Hungarians
\'Madryars' or Magyars), Czechs, Slovaks, and others, S96 and 1005. 'KOHCKpllnuili Ha
J)YKosiHi' ['Conscription in Bukovina']' 9 H06a Ep{()61lHa [Nolla Bukolltnuj (Chernivtsl,
2 Februarv 1912) 1.
59 Deak , for example, explains changes related to a specific communicative practice, duel
ling. Prior to the Liberal reforms, a gentile man might offer an insult to a Jew on the street,
knowing that a jew's status meant that one could ignore a demand for satisfaction in a duel.
Army officers not only could demand satisfaction, they were obliged to by the Austrian officer
corps' honour code, and other officers were obliged to support each other's right to demand
satisfaction. ['It is against the army's notion of honor to refuse chivalrous satisfaction (rit
terliche Genugtuung) to a person simply because he belongs to another nation or religious
community.'] A GUIde for Reserlle Officers (1915), commenting on the case of a German
nationalist military academy student who lost his rank In the army after refusmg ,atisfaction
to a Jewish student who challenged him to a duel, cited in I Deak, jeu'lsh SoldIers in Austro
Hunganan SocIety INew York, Leo Baeck Institute, 1990) 21. As the army incorporated more
Jewish officers (by 1897, everv fifth reserve officer was a Jew) (Deak, IbId, 17), there was an
mcreasmg chance that a Jewish man one met on the street would be a reserve officer and able
to demand satisfaction. The incidence of provocative msults to randomly met Jews dropped.
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or the army. 'While acknowledging his ancestry, he felt first and foremost
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a servant of tbe state and of the dynasty.' Language and the affiliations it
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connotes play a role: the Austrian notable was not ethnic German, but 'par
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tially Germanised' .60 Henri Gobard's model distinguishing different types of
languages is useful here. Gobard distinguishes the vernacular, a maternal or
territorial language, from the 'vehicular', an urban language of commerce
or bureaucratic transmission (as German was in Habsburg Austria).61 We
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might add scholarship to the domains of vehicular language. One striking
phenomenon of late Habsburg Austria is the rise of a supranational figure,
working for fluency in the vehicular language, at the same time that par
ticipation in the everyday affairs of state was reworked to accommodate
vernacular languages of the participating nationalities.
Ehrlich certainly fits the description of the Austrian notable. What is
peculiar is his self-consciousness. He understands that lawyers, notaries
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and judges constituted themselves in social formations that could be stud
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'natives'. Here we recall the broad scope of his 1903 proposal, where the
subjects of his study include judges and document producers with the every
day producers of 'real life' who should be investigated.
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From Free School to User Theory of Rights
Responding to the Multi-national Empire and Constitutional Democracy
As we saw in Tomaszczuk's vision for the University of Czernowitz, some
concepts and organisational methods inspired by the multi-national empire
in themselves served as a common purpose and touchstone for Austrian
identity. Plurality was taken for granted as the base from which Austrian
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citizens came, and not necessarily as a centripetal force that threatened the
unity of the empire. This is the point of departure for Ehrlich's own ideas
on how law works.
Ehrlich took up the perennial question of the age of codification, what
to do with 'gaps' in the Code. Ehrlich claimed intellectual lineage with a
branch of the 'Free School of Law' following Fran<rois Geny, who had pro
posed that gaps should be filled by a 'free decision of the judge', subject to
the judge's understanding of social utility, his innate sense of justice and the
subject of the dispute (in Geny's words, 'the nature of the thing'). The judge

60

Berenger, above n 42, 228.
Gobard's other types are referential language, entailing cultural reference; and mythic
language, caught up in a transcendent spiritual or religious practice (a5 Latin was in Austrian
Catholicism). Henri Gobard cited in G Deleuze and F Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor
LIterature, D Polen (tr) (Minneapolis, Universitv of Minnesota Press, 1986 (1975)) 23.
61
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and his intent replace the legislator and his, as the key figure in juristic
analysis and in the practical matter of filling gaps. (Ehrlich took the state's
description of separation of powers less literally than Geny, understanding
that executive branch administrators could take decisions interpreting regu
lations that served as the functional equivalent of judicial decisions, but his
analytical tack was the same as Geny's.) As Ehrlich notes:
[TJhe significance of law in the daily life of a people depends far more on the
persons charged with its administration than on the principles according to which
it is administered .62

Where would one look for sources of law to deal with gaps in the Code?
The alternative to the written for Ehrlich is not orality as much as it is cus
tom. Ehrlich had started his career as a classics scholar writing on Roman
customary law, and later we see the formative influence of ethnography on
his developing theory of what 'custom' is. Looking at the details of daily
life, Ehrlich came to the conclusion that by definition humans in society
produced social order through regular practices, which in turn gave rise to
binding norms. Recall that for Ehrlich, a social association is:
... [aJ plurality of human beings who, in their relations with one another, recog
nize certain rules of conduct as binding, and, generally at least, actually regulate
their conduct according to them.63

The 'inner order' of associations is determined by what Ehrlich calls 'legal
norms', not to be confused with legal propositions. The legal proposition is
the 'precise, universally binding formulation of the legal precept in a book
of statutes or in a law book'. The 'legal norm' by contrast does not neces
sarily depend on spoken or written communication for its expression: it is
'the legal command, reduced to practice, as it obtains in a definite associa
tion, perhaps of very small size, even without any formulation in words'.64
Ehrlich worried that legal authorities increasingly slighted customary legal
norms in the era of codification. Introductory textbooks assure us that:
... customary law is of equal force with written law. Yet, if one looks at the actual
practice rather than the verbal expression, one will soon come to the conclusion
that treatises, manuals, essays, and decisions proceed from an assumption-never,
of course, openly confessed-that there really is no law except statutory law.65

The thrust of Ehrlich's argument here is key: associations of human beings
are formed when individuals recognise certain rules of conduct as binding.
Ehrlich calls these rules of conduct 'law'. Law is by definition a part of

62
63
64
65

Ehrlich,
Ehrlich,
Ehrlich,
Ehrlich,

'Judicial Freedom', above n 6, 48.
fundamental Principles, above n 14, ,)9.
IbId, 38.
'Judicial Freedom', above n 6, 50.
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human associations. Since Ehrlich has already told us that a society is the
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sum total of associations of human beings, legal pluralism must be an inherent
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call heteroglossia66 and what later anthropologists would, in various ways,

his

quality of society. Law, then, necessarily takes the form that Bakhtin would
call legal pluralism. Ehrlich illuminates for us the basic social fact of legal
pluralism and further gives us a methodology for tapping into those rich
resources as a source of law for state decision-makers. What he neglects
to cover is an inevitable product of legal pluralism: conflicts of laws. He
does not describe for us what happens when a person, case or collective
is simultaneously subject to more than one normative order that conflicts
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with one another, nor instructs us how a decision-maker should choose
between them or reconcile conflicts. This problem is left for the future. It
is not a surprise, then, that conflicts-of-Iaws doctrine is the area taken up
as the first major area of US legal reform by Legal Realists (and becomes,
perhaps, the source of its greatest cynicism).
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Ehrlich was not concerned with homogenising or pluralising.67 A note
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here is in order on space and time, territory and history, in Ehrlich's work.
Ehrlich critiques codes not only in their reach across space, but (perhaps
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more strongly) in their reach across time, not with regard to their heavy
hand as much as to their dead hand:
Accordingly, our codes are uniformly adapted to a time much earlier than their
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own, and all the juristic technique in the world would be unable to extract the
actual law of the present from it, for the simple reason that it is not contained
therein. But the territory within which our codes are valid is so vast, the legal rela
tions with which they deal are so incomparably richer, more subject to changes
than they ever have been ... To attempt to imprison the law of a time or of a
people within the sections of a code is about as reasonable as to attempt to con
fine a stream within a pond.68

Weiler argues that the persistent question of Austrian governance was
'from the many, one' or 'out of one, many', and that Ehrlich advocated
the latter.69 However, as Ehrlich's work proceeded, I think he argued
rather for legal decisions that reflect social reality. His argument for an
66
For a discussion of heterogiossia and diaiogism, see M Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel' in
I Holquist (ed), C Emerson and M Holquist (trs), The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by
M.M. Bakhtin (Austin, "IX, University of Texas Press, 1981 (1934-45)) 259-422, particularly

at 270--75.
1i7 Likhovski, looking into the generative conditions for anti-formalist movements, tells us that
Ehrlich's Chernivtsi was like Pound's Lincoln, Nebraska: a provincial town on the frontier of
empire, where different cultures clashed and the legal culture of the centre had onlv a tenuous
hold (Likhovski, above n 5, 622). Ehrlich by contrast conveys the sense that we get of Austria
Hungary from other contemporary sources: not an empire using law as a centripetal force, but
,lll agglomeration of rich cultures used by the emperor to forge and manipulate alliances to
maintain loyalty to the dynasty (Ehrlich, Fundamental Prmciples, above n 14, 487-8).
6
8 Ehrlich, ibId, 487-8.
(,9 Weiler, above tl 5.
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understanding of law as heteroglossia reflects empirical findings, not a
political preference.
It is important to note how this conception of law departs from the Free
School. Although Ehrlich does not frame his conception of law as a rejec
tion of the Free School's, we are no longer talking about stuff to fill gaps
in the Code. We are talking about multiple legal discourses that carry on

.-

constantly and independently of the Code, which Ehrlich proposes judges
and decision-makers call on as sources of information about existing law
when the decision-maker encounters a gap in law that happens to be writ
ten down already. Without fanfare, Ehrlich reframes the Free School discus
sion of 'gaps' into an account of legal pluralism.
To say that law is more than commands of the state at this point would
be redundant. Forestalling some formalist critics, in his inaugural address
as rector in 1906, Ehrlich reported conclusions about customary law from

: ' '"

his long research into Roman legal history, but as its title shows, he framed

..

it for the contemporary argument. In Die Tatsache des Gewohnheitrechts
(The Fact of Customary Law), he concludes that:
... when the classical Roman jurists speak of ius civile they mean Roman customary
law; but when they quite generally speak of mores or consuetudo, they do not.l°

.

.,

This address seems a carefully calculated attempt to head off critics who
would argue that going beyond the state for a definition of law means that
just anything could be classified as 'law'. Ehrlich anticipates that argument
and inoculates his model against it by demarcating an inside and an outside
of Roman customary law. To some extent, though, it cannot be avoided

-

h

that demarcation is in tension with the holism that underwrites his concep
tion of society and law. The boundary problems that orality, custom and
ultimately ethnography raise are still with us.
The radical innovation that Ehrlich proposes to the Free School is
that the judge's sense of what to do in an instant case be predominantly
informed by careful study of current practice in the domain in controversy.
If a case involves suit for damages of spoiled milk from a milk-seller to a
buyer, find out what community standards for evaluating milk quality and
apportioning risk are, and apply them. Again, it is not that Ehrlich seeks
to create many social groups or to streamline them; he assumes that they
exist and proposes a means for incorporating their standards into legal deci
sions. After Nader, who, analysing the development of the common law in
the United States, elaborates a 'user theory of law',:"l I would call Ehrlich's
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Ehrlich, Fundamental PrinCIpiI's, above n 14, 441.

L Nader, 'A User Theory of Legal Change as Applied to Gender' III The Nebraska
SymposIUm on MotivatIOn: The Law as a Behavioural Instrument 1-33; and L Nader, Life,
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approach to addressing gaps a 'user theory of rights'. Like .Jhering, he does
not believe that rights are metaphysical entities to be found as a part of
human make-up, nor are they principles to be deduced and constructed
from a code. Unlike .Jhering, whose purposive jurisprudence would pose
as a primary question for a judge filling a gap, 'What outcome do we
want?', Ehrlich would ask, 'What are people doing?'. We understand, then,
how the question of methodology becomes central to Ehrlich's program.
Ethnography is required for the judge to learn what current practice is.
Ehrlich starts his "Seminar in Living Law" to teach law students how to
study the details of real life and to enlist them in investigations.
Once discovered by German-reading American legal scholars inspired
by the Free School, Ehrlich's work enjoyed rapid dissemination in the
United States. The Free Finding of Law and Free Legal Science (1903)
and Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1913) in particular
sparked their imagination. News of his efforts to put these insights to
work in a sy stematic ethnographic enterprise to inform legal content, in
his "Seminar in Living Law" at the University of Czernowitz, provoked
great interest. Ehrlich was invited to address the influential Association of
American Law Schools in Chicago in December 1914, but the difficulties
of wartime travel precluded his attending. An explanation of his seminar,
both its methodology and some preliminary results, were presented in
absentia.72

In Two Places at Once

I argue above that, while Ehrlich's methodology, ethnography, was a radical
proposal in the Free School's discussion of how judges should make their
decisions, it was less striking in the late Habsburg context. A confluence of
factors-an emperor tolerant of difference within a frame of dy nastic loy
alty, Liberal political reforms, rising national consciousness-led to many
experiments in operationalising toleration within the structures of gov
ernmental organisation and practice across the empire. Pluralism was not
only protected; arguably, given the electoral and imperial politics around
the new parliamentary democracies in the crown lands, plurality may even
have been cultivated.
Ehrlich carved out for himself a position that Nader has described as 'the
double marginal',73 which became a defining position of twentieth-century
ethnographers. Ehrlich developed a methodology based on duration in a
time of hit-and-run survey work, conducting his fieldwork right where he
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had spent most of his life, but also insistently plunged into international
scholarly discourse. Immersion in the local was as fundamental to his work
as his commitment to the cross-cutting associations that defined his profes
sional identity. Though a specialist in the local, he became part of a group
of supranational notables, working in the vernacular, but transmitting in
the vehicular.

ETHNOGRAPHY (REPRISE): THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHIC METHOD

What, then, did ethnography come to mean for the Ehrlich of late Hapsburg
Bukovina? There are several important ways in which he differs from his
contemporaries.
Experience as Method and Science

Ehrlich argues that social order and social institutions, although not tan
gible, are susceptible to sense perception.l4 Every investigator must devise
the method that suits his or her own individuality, but 'whatever method
or technique it may be, its starting point will always be that which the
external world presents to the human mind'. 75 Experience is the basis for
Ehrlich's empiricism and a central justification for ethnography as a means
of inquiry. As opposed to other sciences based on observation, however,
the investigator is not remote from his or her subjects beyond class or
professional separations inherent in their milieu. It is the immediacy of
perception, the direct experience that makes the work empirical. This kind
of ethnography depends on experience as method.
This reliance on experience as a basis for empiricism shows us that
although Ehrlich reacted against the 'legal science' practised in the nine
teenth century, he does not discard science as discipline and aspiration, but
rather thinks through a particular meaning for science. Ehrlich calls for
developing both practical and theoretical legal science. Although famous
for his promotion of a practical science of law incorporating insights from
in situ observation of the 'living law' into judicial decisions, his less famous
promotion of a theoretical science of law was no less central to his program
for research, teaching and conduct of law. The two are intimately connected
for Ehrlich. A theoretical science for Ehrlich is marked by systematicity and
deduction based on empirical observation.
Only after a concrete observation is finished does the scientist ask himself whether
the principles which he has deduced from the specific observation hold true
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generally; and he can determine this fact only by a series of concrete observations.
The same is true for the legal investigator.76

fes

Observation, Ehrlich thought, should also be used as part of the method

)UP
111

for formulating a problem for research. Montesquieu claimed that he 'laid
down principles and saw particular cases y ield to them of themselves'.
Ehrlich adds:
That is seemingly the genuine scholastic method, beginning with principles and
progressing to particular cases by logical ratiocination. But in reality the prin

>urg
his

ciples Montesquieu starts with are not conceived

a

priori. They are all derived

from facts he collected, scrutinized, and turned over in his mind during the twenty
years he was engaged in his work.77

We have discussed how, in Habsburg use, ethnography could be used
interchangeably with ethnicity and indicated a descriptive genre. The latter
remains the predominant meaning of 'ethnography ' in current parlance:
tan
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one writes an ethnography. As we saw, for other social scientists at the
turn of the century, ethnography could also indicate the additional prac
tice of gathering data: one collected ethnographic material. Here, Ehrlich
sees the limit that distinguishes his work from his contemporaries. He
gathered social facts like Bogosic, Bobcev, Costa and other ethnographers,
hut, he emphasises, they did not develop their observations into a sy s
tematic body of statements, a sociology. Bogosic, for example, 'supplied
us with invaluable material' in writing up a codification of Montenegran
property law based not merely on the small number of legal propositions,
but 'chietly on the concrete legal relations and legal institutions'. In writ
ing with the object not of a historical understanding but of that which is in
existence, today, Bogosic produced a 'recognized masterpiece'. However,
nonetheless, 'it would be a vain endeavour to look for general thoughts in
his works'J8 The only peer whom Ehrlich thinks has taken on the same
kind of project, of close ethnographic observation used as the basis for
study of patterns and generalisations, was the Austrian-Ukrainian ethnog
rapher Dniestrzanski in his Customary Law and the Social AssociationsJ9
In his work, Ehrlich recognised the germs of a number of thoughts like
those he was presenting in Fundamental Principles in the Sociology of

Law. Data-gathering is not enough. Ethnography also meant a mode of
analysing data: one thought through ethnography. Ethnography serves as
epistemology.

ether
true

-,; Ehrlich, 'Seminar', above n 49, 59.
-- Ehrlich, 'Montesquieu', above n 13,587.
-g Ehrlich, Fundamental PrinCiples, above n 14, 465-6.
-9 S Dniestrzanski, Das Gewohnheitsrecht und die sO::Jalen Verbande (Customary Law and
'he Social Associations) (Czernowitz, 1905), cited in Ehrlich, Fundamental Prtnczples, above
n 14,465 and 499.
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T he Humanities and the Place of the Translator
Ethnography as epistemology requires a certain sort of food for thought.
Vienna's other new social sciences, like psychology, agreed that what was
understood as 'artistic sensibility' is part of good social science. so Ehrlich
firmly located his ethnographic work at the intersection of science and art.

f f',j,

Every true work of science is a work of art, and the man who is not an artist is a
poor man of science. Production of a work of science requires the same qualifica
tions as production of a work of art.S1

He understood this to have methodological implications. As artists:
... every independent investigator must create his own method, just as every

"\

: '''''-

creative artist must create his own technique ... For the mind which thinks and
works independently will ever be seeking new methods and new techniques which

\.

correspond to his individuality.82

"

While Ehrlich here acknowledges the role of creativity in scientific
inquiry, that is not to confuse scholarly work with creation or individuality
with authorship. Rather, implicit throughout Ehrlich's project is a central
purpose: ethnography itself was to be an act of translation. He emerged
from Austrian pluralism with a goal not of homogeneity, but of communi
cation. In Ehrlich's program, the natives' own legal documents, practices,
customs would be translated from the vernacular into the vehicular lan
guage of bureaucratic administration of justice.

"

'-

."

Ethnography is translation in another respect. The ethnographer is not
correctly understood as the author of ethnography; rather it is the subjects,
the group of humans under study, who have produced the content. The
ethnographer is transcriber, except that in most cases the target reader is
one who does not understand the vocabulary of practice being presented.
If the ethnographer has made the switch to a methodology of the humani
ties, adopting the natives' own terms and ideas for understanding practice
from within, the analysis he or she produces is not mere reproduction, still
unintelligible to the alien reader. Instead, the ethnographer is translator of
that which a collective has authored, as Ehrlich has taught us, as a body of
custom. Here is where we see the old story of tool-use retold: the tool was
fashioned and eventually the tool refashioned the tool-bearers. In Ehrlich's
case, ethnography transforms his work from legal theory to social science,
but instead of a grand science of eternal truths, one of emergent tales of

80
See also Malinowski, Argonauts of the W'estern Pacific (Prospect Heights, IL, Waveland
Press, 1984 (1922)) 18.
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the particular. Ethnography can transform the ethnographer from master
scientist into translator of the vernacular.
ht.
\\-as

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

lich
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Epilogue
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There is a tension to this day in ethnography between an Enlightenment
commitment to human universals and a Romantic commitment to particu
lars. Ehrlich's program for a sociological jurisprudence, like many Austrian
experiments in governance, sought to integrate the particular into the

very

and
-hich

whole. However, Ehrlich's laboratory of a legal science and the pluralistic
empire it served succumb to the former.
On 22 October 1918, a Romanian propaganda organ Glasul Bucouinei
(Bukovina's Voice) began to appear in Chernivtsi. Its editorial board attacked

1tific

Bukovina's 'Austrian' pluralist tradition and urged Romanian-speakers to

ality
ntral

unite. On 17 October 1918, a Romanian National Council had formed in

·rged

of Austria based on nationalities. In his last imperial audience, the president

Vienna in response to the emperor's manifesto calling for the federalisation

l
1Uil

of the council informed Franz Josef that the Romanians would vote against

tices,
lan-

a reformed monarchy, the equivalent to a declaration of ethnic Romanian
secession. On 27 October 1918, a Constituent Assembly of the Romanians of
Bukovina met in Chernivtsi and voted for the union of Bukovina with other

not

'Romanian lands'. These moves carried ominous overtones: already in pre

jects,
. The

war Romania, a struggle for national self-definition against the pluralism and

:fer is

ing that 'to be Romanian became synonymous with being an anti-Semite' .83

-nted.

At a 'General Congress' in Chernivtsi boycotted by Ukrainians and Jews,

5

toleration of Austria across the border had resulted in part in an understand

naill

Romanian, German and Polish delegates voted unanimously for the union of

actice

Bukovina with Romania. The ambitions of France at the Paris negotiations

still

at the end of the War, eager to reward Romania as a perceived ally and to

tor of

establish it as a buffer state, aligned with those of Romanian chauvinists.

)dy of

Bukovina was incorporated into Romania in January 1919.84

1,

)1 was

That same month, a new Romanian administrator, Ion Nistor (who had

rlich's

been one of the underground editors of Glasul Bucouinei), took the rector

ience,

,hip of the University of Czernowitz (the post Ehrlich had held at the begin

lies of

ning of his reform program in 1906). Nistor declared in his first speech as

aveland

rector that he sought to purge the province and the university of a despised
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species, humo bukovinensis, the name he gave to a creature that tolerated
the mishmash of communities and thrived under pluralism. Ehrlich, like all
but three faculty members of the two secular departments of the university,
was an A ustrian who did not speak Romanian. The student body was
also mixed. The last figures from before the First World War, the 1913-14
school year, give a total of 1,198 students at the university, including:

401 Jews, 310 Romanians, 303 Ukrainians, 86 Polish and 57 Germans.85
Nistor 'invited' non-Romanians on the faculty to use Bukovina's new offi
cial language, 'failing which they would have to leave'. Only four Austrian
professors consented to these conditions and remained. Decree 4091
of 23 September 1919 formally transformed the Austrian University of
Czernowitz into the Romanian University of Cernau i.86
Withdrawing to Vienna offered scant respite. As Wittgenstein wrote to
Bertrand Russell in 1918 upon returning horne to Vienna from the Italian
prisoner-of-war camp in which he spent the last nine months of the war,
'The city is starving'Y The conditions of Ehrlich's last years are murky. It
is said Ehrlich died on 22 May 1922 in Vienna, although Pound thought it
was I April.88

CONCLlJSION

What are ethnography and a human science good for? In the spirit of mod
ernism, one would be tempted to issue a ringing conclusion. One could
issue a call to the new science, an empirical science using experience as
the method of data collection and basis for analysis. Ethnography could
yield hypotheses tested by local observation and challenge hypotheses alien
to experience. Ethnography depends on the notion that understanding of
human experience can transcend context. Ehrlich emphasised that we could
learn about the plurality in which we live, but implicitly he also argued
that it should inform a more comprehensive science of law that could claim
broader insights about human ordering. This commitment affirms that we
can learn from each other about ourselves. With ethnography as a tool, one
is uniquely equipped to advocate for the species. Go forth, make science!
However ... it would also be true to Ehrlich to give a more modest
answer. This is what I mean by modesty. Ehrlich's legal science differs from

s F Riedl, 'Die Umversltat Czernowitz, 1875-1920: Ein Bltek auf Ihr Wesen und Ihre
EntwlCklung BeZiehungen Zll Ost- und Mitteldeutschland' 2 Mltteldeutsche Vortrdge (1971)
19, CIted III Llvezeanu, above n 22, 23L
'h Llvezeanu, ahove n 22, 23L
s- L Wmgemtelll, GH von Wnght (ed), Letters to Russell, [(nne,', ,md Moore (Oxford,
Bast! Blackwell, 1974).
sx R
Pound, ohltuMY note on Fugen Ihrbch as preface to Ehrlich', I h, ()uology of Law
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his contemporaries in social science and even from many of his fellow

'all

jurists' legal theory. For him, law is simply a way of discussing that which

;ity,

arises from normal human conduct, another way of describing society as

Nas
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current practice. The late Habsburg political structure left room for local

lI1g:

mg those spaces where the law of empire did not intrude. This seems to be

5 .8

Ehrlich's sense as well. Let the worker bees buzz and bumble between their

5

traditions and political orders, and does not convey a sense of lack regard

lffi

sections of the hive, let them do their work of building, repairing, filling in,

"Ian

carrying away. You could speak of 'gaps' and, while not incorrect, it would

)91

seem a strange characterisation of a honeycomb that is defined as much by

of

its empty spaces as by its connectors. Such, for Ehrlich, is an understanding
of society and law.

to

Ehrlich's program seems less totalising and more contemporary and use

lian

ful to us. Ehrlich's work involved going out and talking to individuals

\'ar,

peasants, priests, notaries, traders, businessmen-understanding in each

... It

modest strand of legal relations that 'society ' is nothing more grand, nor

It it

less, than that. Modest, y es, but still ambitious, clear, close to the ground,
empirical. Ehrlich's work takes his fellow citizens seriously enough to pay
,mention to their details and, as a social scientist recognising their practice as
llready law, his legal reform program gives them authority to create law.
Ehrlich does not use ethnography to create a new set of eternal truths,
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new mythic language that one must master in order to establish author

Ity in law. He is not blind to power relations based on knowledge, but he

offers an alternative to acquiescence or rebellion. Instead, Ehrlich takes on
the work of translating the vernacular into the vehicular language of state
ldministration. His program could be read as a blueprint for governing in
the vernacular. The ethnographer, as translator, is a key link, but does not
claim to produce law or to know the right answers. His proposals rest on
observations of the law that others are already practising.
This is a different kind of authoritative discourse, different from existing
'icience and law. Ethnography in Ehrlich's hands does not furnish bricks to
huild a grand edifice, but the components for a simple mirror. The techno1(lgy does not fix the image in place; in fact, it is chosen because it reflects
the contemporary, the emergent. The ethnographer holds it up so that we
,ee the scientific claim, the legal authority, is the prosaic, changing image of
llurselves and our fellow persons in the mirror.

